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INTRODUCTION
With some notable complications,' the Roberts Court continues to draw upon
common law, custom, and tradition to resolve constitutional disputes. Custom
and tradition anchor a range of recent decisions limiting government authority:
whether we speak of state court power to compel an appearance,2 law enforce-
ment searches with new technology, 3 or congressional power to enforce voting
rights under the Reconstruction Amendments.4 Given this trend, the Second
Amendment right could be another area where a jurisprudence of tradition may
take root.
Assuming the Court is serious about cultivating Second Amendment tradition-
alism, it will inevitably discover that some historical regulations have been
seldom, weakly, or haphazardly enforced and that some once-common practices
have become rare. This phenomenon has a name-desuetude. How the Court
* Duke Law School. Thanks to the Heritage Foundation, the Georgetown Center for the Constitu-
tion, and the Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy for inviting me to participate in their
symposium, Protecting the Right to Bear Arms: History and Challenges, held November 5, 2015. The
author presented a version of this paper at a Roundtable on the Role of Custom, Convention, and
Tradition in U.S. Constitutional Law held at Duke Law School, November 9, 2013. Thanks to Joseph
Blocher for reading multiple drafts of this essay.
1. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (plurality) ("Freeform notions
of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the
absence of authority into law.").
3. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) ("[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was
tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century."); cf Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (noting that protection of the interior of homes has "roots deep in the
common law").
4. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013) (arguing that the "tradition of equal
sovereignty" requires extraordinary justifications to authorize the pre-clearance formula for the Voting
Rights Act).
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV.
246, 249 (2008) (footnotes omitted) ("In the Second Amendment context, the Court had sparse
precedents with which to work . . .. [M]any judges might be drawn to the original understanding even
if they would not consider it, or would not give it a great deal of weight, if they were writing on an
unclean slate.").
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approaches desuetude will say as much about the Court's commitment to a
tradition-based jurisprudence as it will about the future course of Second
Amendment doctrine.
Desuetude also raises broader issues of constitutional theory. First, if desue-
tude becomes a common tool to pare away relevant from irrelevant data in
construing tradition, is there some neutral principle to govern its use, or is
desuetude simply an instrument to arrive at pre-determined policy preferences?
Second, and relatedly, how does desuetude fit with notions of originalism,
common law constitutionalism, popular constitutionalism, original public meth-
ods originalism, or some blending of these methodologies? Finally, what does
desuetude say about the timeless debates about the sources of constitutional
law? Can desuetude distinguish legal norm creation from political norm cre-
ation, and, if so, how?6 This essay raises these issues as topics for reflection
rather than resolution.
I. SECOND AMENDMENT TRADITIONALISM
District of Columbia v. Heller7 and McDonald v. City of Chicago" repeatedly
invoke tradition. These opinions use tradition to identify the values the Second
Amendment protects as well as the regulations it permits despite those protec-
tions. The amendment protects the individual possession of firearms for "tradi-
tionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home." 9 But what other
"traditional[] lawful purposes" it protects is not specified. It may protect hunt-
ing.1 o It may protect target shooting. The Court has not yet elaborated on what
other practices are traditional, or how to identify such practices.
The Court cites tradition to support restrictions as well, even when those
restrictions seem to contradict the value the right protects. As Justice Scalia said
in his McDonald concurrence, "traditional restrictions ... show the scope of the
right."" Bans on sawed-off shotguns are constitutional because they derive
from the "historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and
unusual weapons.'"1 2 This prohibition is valid irrespective of whether such
weapons advance the core self-defense value at the heart of the right.
The Court's traditionalism implies that if a type of arm, or bearing, or
keeping, is not traditional, then the activity is not protected; it also implies that,
if the regulation is not traditional, the regulation is unconstitutional. But answer-
6. See Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Custom, 48 TEX. INT'L L.J. 523, 530 (2013) ("As the
phenomenon of desuetude illustrates, a rule of recognition could recognize as law only most statutes,
rather than all of them.").
7. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
8. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
9. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (characterizing the Respondent's Brief).
10. See Joseph Blocher, Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 133 (2015).
11. McDonald, 561 U.S., at 802 (Scalia, J., concurring).
12. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (citing, inter alia, 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148-149
(1769)).
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ing the one question does not necessarily answer the other. For example, few
have identified a longstanding tradition of persons taking firearms to school;
but, so far, few have identified a longstanding tradition of regulating firearms at
school (although such regulations do appear as early as the 19th century1 3 ). The
Supreme Court did say that longstanding prohibitions on carrying firearms into
"sensitive places" included schools, but it did not offer specific evidence to
support the assertion.1 4 Schools may be able to prohibit firearms because no
demonstrable tradition of bearing firearms into schools exists. It could be that
bearing arms to school is traditional in some rural areas where hunting is
popular, but that there is a counter-tradition of regulating such activity. It could
be that a specific school-related regulation of weapons is unnecessary, given a
more general tradition of state regulation of public schools1 5 or public prop-
erty.16 Or schools could constitutionally prohibit firearms for simple utilitarian
or instrumental reasons, and tradition is merely a make-weight.
Further, the Court's imprecise appeal to tradition poses a host of familiar
conceptual and interpretive problems. 17 What does the court mean by tradition?
Whose tradition? English, American, African-American, Native-American, city,
country, South, North? Tradition as expressed over what duration of time? Since
the thirteenth century? Since the sixteenth? The eighteenth? Does the historical
evidence relevant to a tradition end in 1791, in 1868, in 1930, or 2016?8 At what
level of abstraction is the tradition to be drawn?1 9 And what of conflicting traditions,
or conflicting claims to a tradition; as, for example, claims to traditional public policing
13. See, e.g., 1 Statutes of Oklahoma, Art. 47, § 7, at 496 (Will T. Little, L.G. Pittman & R.J. Barker
eds., 1891) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, except a peace officer, to carry into any church or
religious assembly, any school room or other place where persons are assembled for public worship, for
amusement, or for educational or scientific purposes ... any of the weapons designated in sections one
and two of this article."); An Act Regulating the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Art. 6511, in 2 A Digest
of the Laws of Texas, at 1322 (George Paschal, 3d ed., 1873) ("If any person shall go into any church
or religious assembly, any school-room or other place where persons are assembled for educational,
literary, or scientific purposes ... and shall have about his person a bowieknife, dirk, or butcher-knife,
or fire-arms,. . .such person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ."); see also
Crimes and Punishments, § 387, 1 Revised Statues of the Arizona Territory, at 1252 (1901) (same).
14. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing after Heller: Standards of Scrutiny,
Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAw. 1, 80 (2009).
15. See United States v. Lopez, 14 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (identifying "education" as an area "where
States historically have been sovereign").
16. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
Analytical Framework and Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1443, 1473 (2009) (discussing the
"government as proprietor" rationale for regulation).
17. See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment
Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013).
18. For example, the "common use" test for protected weapons suggested by Heller seems to draw
upon modem customs. Judge Kavanaugh pointed to the sales of firearms at the sports retailer Cabela's
as evidence of common use. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1287 (2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting). See also Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1032 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment) (per curiam) ("[T]he pertinent Second Amendment inquiry is whether stun guns are
commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes today.").
19. See Miller, supra note 17, at 919; see also Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of
Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1075-77 (1990).
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by communities of Freedmen as compared to communities of white supremacists? 2 0
Moreover, the relationship between tradition and the written language of the
Second Amendment is not clear. How much of this tradition is an enforceable
constitutional norm, as opposed to a rule of construction, or an aspiration? It
could be tradition forms a freestanding source of constitutional norms irrespec-
tive of the text. 21 Alternatively, it could be tradition is simply informative of
how to read the text.2 2 If the latter, what of traditions that appear to contradict
the strict semantic meaning of the Second Amendment, as, for example, prohibi-
tions on carrying concealed weapons? 23
II. "DESUETUDE, AMERICAN STYLE" IN SECOND AMENDMENT THEORY
AND LITIGATION
Assuming courts must identify tradition at some level of abstraction to
enforce the Second Amendment, some behavior or regulations that would
constitute this tradition unquestionably have fallen into desuetude. Desuetude is
the concept that a law may lose legitimacy by a protracted period of non-
enforcement, often coupled with flagrant and open non-compliance by the
people.24 More loosely, desuetude can also refer to institutions, protections, or
cultural practices that have become isolated or uncommon. Both notions of
desuetude appear to do work in Heller.
Desuetude, as a legal doctrine, is a creature of civil law and may still enjoy
official recognition in some jurisdictions, such as Scotland.25 But desuetude, as
with other civil law concepts, has occasionally migrated into English and
American law, sometimes on its own terms, sometimes cloaked as "due pro-
cess" or "equal protection." 26 This form of desuetude enjoyed something of a
minor renaissance in constitutional theory when Cass Sunstein used it to explain
the Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas.27 He called this form "desuetude
20. See Miller, supra note 17, at 913.
21. See Volokh, supra note 16, at 1450-51 (making these points).
22. Id. See also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453, 465, 482 & n.100 (2013) (discussing how practice or history may contribute "contextual
enrichment" to vague or ambiguous terms).
23. Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (defining arm
as "any thing that a man . . . takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another."), and id.
at 584 ("At the time of the founding, as now, to 'bear' meant to 'carry."'), with id. at 626 (suggesting
that carrying concealed weapons may be prohibited).
24. See, e.g., Arthur E. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IowA L.
REV. 389, 395-96 (1964); Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2209, 2209 (2006).
25. Bonfield, supra note 24, at 395-405; Note, supra note 24, at 2209.
26. See Bonfield, supra note 24, at 430. See also Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v.
Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720, 724 (W. Va. 1992) ("Desuetude, like vagueness, is based on the concept of
fairness embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses. Thus, a law prohibiting vagrancy is
unfair because it is both broad and vague ... ; similarly, a law prohibiting some act that has not given
rise to a real prosecution in 20 years is unfair to the one person selectively prosecuted under it.").
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage, 2003 Sup. C. REV. 27 (2003). See also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUs BRANCH
148-56 (2d ed. 1986) (making arguments from desuetude concerning laws on contraception).
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American style" to distinguish it from its more formal civil law cousin, and he
offered the following gloss: where a fundamental constitutional value is at
stake, the government may not justify a largely unenforced law based on moral
arguments that no longer command public support.28 Perhaps desuetude, so
conceived, explains some of Heller's apparently unsatisfactory reasoning.2 9
Weapons regulations fill the law books of England and America, both prior to
ratification of the Second Amendment and for over a century thereafter.30
Various Second Amendment scholars appeal to desuetude when confronted with
these sources. For example, the Tudor monarchs prohibited the possession of
crossbows and handguns by certain classes.31 Some have suggested these laws
should not influence Second Amendment doctrine because they were either
unknown to the Framers of the Second Amendment, were repealed by Parlia-
ment, or were infrequently or partially enforced.32 The Statute of Northampton,
a medieval law enacted in the fourteenth century but with its roots in ancient
Athens, generally criminalized the public carrying of arms except by certain
elites and peacekeeping officials.3 3 Scholars like Joyce Malcolm have argued-
perhaps erroneously-that such regulations were seldom enforced.
28. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 30, 51-52.
29. For a discussion of Sunstein's application of desuetude to the Heller case, see infra.
30. See Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry, 125 YALE L.J.
FORUM 121, 128-34 (2015) (citing some of these historical regulations). See also Mark Anthony
Frassetto, Firearms and Weapons Legislation up to the Early 20th Century (Jan. 15, 2013), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2200991 (compiling laws).
31. See An Act Concerning Crossbows and Handguns, 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541) (Eng.), in 3 STATUTES
OF THE REALM 832.
32. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amend-
ment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 258 n.235 (1983); Dave Kopel, Malcolm in the Middle, DAVEKOPEL.ORG
(Sept. 16, 2002), http://www.davekopel.org/NRO/2002/Malcolm-in-the-Middle.htm (observing that Henry
VIII's regulation was "ineffectually and temporarily" enforced).
33. The Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.) states:
[N]o man great nor small, of what condition soever he be, except the king's servants in his
presence, and his ministers in executing of the king's precepts, or of their office, and such as
be in their company assisting them, and also [upon a cry made for arms to keep the peace, and
the same in such places where such acts happen,] be so hardy to come before the King's
justices, or other of the King's ministers doing their office, with force and arms, nor bring no
force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor
in the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit
their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the King's pleasure. And that the King's
justices in their presence, sheriffs, and other ministers in their bailiwicks, lords of franchises,
and their bailiffs in the same, and mayors and bailiffs of cities and boroughs, within the same
cities and boroughs, and borough-holders, constables, and wardens of the peace within their
wards, shall have power to execute this act.
1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 258 (capitalization modernized). See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAR-
IES *149 (relating the Statute of Northampton to "the laws of Solon," which stated that "every Athenian
was finable who walked about the city in armour").
34. JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 104
(1998) (stating that the statute was rarely enforced except for "occasional[]" indictments where persons
"terrorize[d] their neighbors"). But see Patrick Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical
Crisis: Why the Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing "Standard Model" Moving For-
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Justice Scalia engaged in an argument from desuetude when he distinguished
away colonial-era laws that criminalized the firing of weapons, the carrying of
firearms into dwellings, or the improper storage of gunpowder. 3 5 Scalia ex-
pressed doubt that these regulations would have been upheld against individuals
pressed by the immediate necessity of self-defense.3 6 But, perhaps cognizant
that almost all regulations contain unwritten, common law exceptions for
necessity, he also remarked on the insignificant penalties associated with these
regulations.
The thrust of these arguments is that superannuated, unenforced, or under-
enforced regulations do not shape the Second Amendment and cannot under-
mine broader and more abstract Second Amendment values. But if we care
about a methodology that looks to tradition, there should be a theory that
explains why these portions of Anglo-American tradition are irrelevant. Perhaps
some theory of desuetude American style is at work here, but, if so, it needs
elaboration. At present, it still looks very much like picking one's friends out of
a crowd.38
Further, if tradition is to become an intelligible basis for a decision, a court
must peer beyond law books and regulations and look at actual practice to
identify the scope of constitutional protection. Here again, desuetude comes into
play. Practices that were once common but have become rare do not meet the
strict legal definition of desuetude. Nevertheless, desuetude as the decline of a
social practice also appears to define the scope of the Second Amendment right.
For example, weapons that are not in "common use" or that are "dangerous and
unusual" do not fit within the definition of an "Arm" protected by the Second
Amendment. 39 Heller thus suggests that firearms that were once common, but
are no longer, could perhaps lose constitutional protection. 4 0 Also, arguments
from desuetude support the notion that some behaviors associated with the
initial codification of the right, such as the ability to conduct private policing, or
to form a detachment of the "citizens' militia" to apprehend criminals, or to aid
ward, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1727, 1804 (2012) (arguing that the statute was enforced); Patrick
J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus Ahistorical
Standards of Review, 60 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 1, 7-40 (2012) (same). Cf Ruben & Cornell, supra note
30, at 128-34 (arguing why case law research may not accurately show the frequency of enforcement).
35. "[W]e would not stake our interpretation of the Second Amendment upon a single law, in effect
in a single city, that contradicts the overwhelming weight of other evidence regarding the right to keep
and bear arms for defense of the home." Heller, 554 U.S. at 632.
36. Id.
37. "A broader point about the laws that Justice Breyer cites: All of them punished the discharge (or
loading) of guns with a small fine and forfeiture of the weapon (or in a few cases a very brief stay in the
local jail), not with significant criminal penalties." Id. at 633.
38. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's use of social science data for "look[ing] over the heads of the crowd and pick[ing] out its
friends.").
39. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
40. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 726-29 (2012) (discussing "common use" test as meaning arms that are not
commonly used are not protected).
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another in resisting an unlawful arrest, may no longer rise to the level of
constitutionally protected activity.4 1 In any event, if further litigation will
elaborate the manner in which outdated regulations shape the Second Amend-
ment, courts also will have to address the constitutional relevance of outdated
practices relating to firearms.
III. A FEW THOUGHTS ON DESUETUDE AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
If desuetude, American style or some other style, gains traction in Second
Amendment doctrine, it will raise broader issues about constitutional theory and
jurisprudence.42 Among those issues, is desuetude simply a device to trim
historical evidence to fit pre-conceived policy ends, or is it governed by neutral
rules of application? 43 Relatedly, is desuetude sufficiently familiar in Anglo-
American jurisprudence to qualify as a form of original methods originalism?
Finally, what about desuetude and law-making by non-judicial communities: is
desuetude a mechanism by which, as Matt Adler has written, overlapping
communities engage with each other over the legal status of constitutional
norms?44
At least at first blush, the minimalist view of desuetude that Sunstein uses to
explain Lawrence may be applicable to Heller and McDonald. Both seem to say
that infrequently or haphazardly enforced sanctions rooted in outmoded moral
commitments cannot contradict other fundamental constitutional values. In fact,
Sunstein suggested that Heller could be construed as a minimalist decision
along these lines, although he concluded that desuetude, even American style,
does not fit Heller, because the District of Columbia regulation was relatively
new and actively enforced.45
Nevertheless, it could be possible to systematize desuetude the same way as
other, less exotic doctrines. For example, a court could specify that if there is
evidence that x regulation was never enforced, or infrequently enforced, over y
years, and subject to z examples of its public repudiation, it is subject to less
weight for purposes of constitutional construction. This task would be no
different from those jurisdictions that recognize desuetude as a defense and
41. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (suggesting that the "degree of fit" between the militia clause and the
"operative clause" has loosened).
42. New scholarship by Richard Albert and John Stinneford has begun tackling these matters. See
Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude, 62 AM. J. COMp. L. 641 (2014);
John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 532 (2014).
43. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
44. Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices
Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 719 (2006).
45. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 263 ("A doctrine that would authorize challenges to recent departures
and innovations raises quite different considerations from a doctrine that merely authorizes attacks on
anachronistic laws. In this respect, Bickel's understanding of Griswold offers no help in Heller.").
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have had to fashion formal elements for its application.4 6 One could use
desuetude in a similar way to understand the specific practices that the Constitu-
tion protects. Whereas at one time assaulting a police officer attempting an
unlawful arrest may have been a common practice of self-defense, it has fallen
so far out of generally accepted conduct as to be unprotected today.47
If desuetude were domesticated into American constitutional jurisprudence,
would it qualify as a form of "original methods originalism?" 48 John McGinnis
and Michael Rappaport have argued that the proper method of constitutional
adjudication is through "the interpretive methods that the constitutional enactors
would have deemed applicable to [the Constitution]." James Pfander and
Daniel Birk have cited the influence of Scottish jurists, lawyers, and philoso-
phers on the Framers of the Constitution.5 0 Although desuetude was not widely
recognized in England, it appears to have been a fixture of Scottish law during
the Founding generation. 1 Perhaps desuetude would be one of these original
methods.
Finally, desuetude, as with the entire notion of custom and tradition, raises
foundational issues about who makes constitutional law. As Matt Adler has
written, debates between and within schools of constitutional thought often turn
on judgments about which communities get to call their norms legal norms.52
Desuetude is potentially a device by which judicial actors, through an ancient
legal mechanism, may take notice of the juris-generative behavior of other
actors, in particular non-judicial officers and laypersons.5 3 As the Court said
46. See Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d. 720, 726-27 (W.Va.
1992) (articulating a three-part test for desuetude). Cf Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Finding Room in the Criminal
Law for the Desuetude Principle, RUTGERS L. REV. COMMENTARIES (Mar. 11, 2014), available at
http://www.rutgerslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/archive/commentaries/2014/LarkinCommentary.
pdf (discussing application of desuetude in the context of overcriminalization).
47. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L. J. 939, 947-66
(2011).
48. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 751 (2009). But see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1771 n.88
(2015) (noting that this move simply "postpones ... the need for normative judgment if ... members
of the Founding generation differed among themselves about applicable norms of constitutional
adjudication.").
49. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 48, at 751.
50. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1613, 1630 (2011). See also Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History:
A Reply to Gordon Wood, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 735-36 (2011) (identifying the Founder's effort to
accommodate "the English, Scottish, and Continental political theory that they had long studied."). But
see Stinneford, supra note 42, at 564 & n. 156 (noting objections by the Framers to novelties in the legal
system that do not comport with English common law).
51. See Bonfield, supra note 24, at 403 (identifying Scottish recognition of desuetude as far back as
1751).
52. See generally Adler, supra note 44. See also Albert, supra note 42, at 654-56, 680-86
(discussing the relationship between desuetude and constitutionalism).
53. As Fred Schauer has written: "[T]he fact that the rule of recognition as it exists in, say, English
law, recognizes only some customs as law is not fundamentally different from the way in which the
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in Poe v. Ullman, "'deeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state
policy . . .'-or not carrying it out-'are often tougher and truer law than the
dead words of the written text.' 5 4 As such, desuetude may be a mechanism to
bridge popular constitutionalism with other, more juris-centric forms of law
making.
same rule of recognition might recognize only some statutes, only some court decisions, or only some
constitutional provisions as law." Schauer, supra note 6, at 530.
54. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502 (1961) (quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Browning, 310
U.S. 362, 369 (1940)); Printz, 416 S.E.2d at 725-726 (citing Poe as supporting desuetude).
